The first Mishnah in Meseches Sukkah begins with a machlokos (legal dispute). According to the chachamim (the general scholarly consensus), a Sukkah taller than 20 amos is invalid. Rabbi Yehudah, however, disagrees and validates this sukkah:

סכה שהיא גבוהה למעלה מעשרים אמה, פסולה.
רבי יהודה מכשיר

A Sukkah that is taller than 20 amos is invalid.
Rabbi Yehuda validates it

Before we analyze this machlokos, let’s note what we are not told here.

We are not told what a Sukkah is; it is neither defined nor described.
We are not told that there is a mitzvah of “dwelling” in a Sukkah.
And we are not told what it legally means for a Sukkah (or anything else) to be valid or invalid.

All of this information is background information that the Mishnah assumes we already have. And for many of us, that is true. But often, we don’t know the relevant background information — and yet, the Mishnah assumes we do.

Why does the Mishnah make such an assumption?
Why doesn’t it provide the foundational information we need to understand it?
And how are we to proceed in such a situation?

The simple answer is that the Mishnah is neither a textbook nor an encyclopedia. Its purpose is not to teach new information, but to record various legal conversations and debates that took place among the Jewish people.

In other words, the goal of the Mishnah is to help us remember a specific body of legal work that was in danger of being forgotten. It serves as a memory device, prompting us to further explore and understand the topics it references.

A modern analogy to understand the Mishnah is the US Supreme Court. Over the years, the Supreme Court has handed down many decisions, and it would be helpful for a scholar, lawyer or judge to have a grasp of these cases.

Imagine a work that gathers together all the Supreme Court decisions throughout the years, but without the legal reasoning behind each opinion. The goal would be to provide a broad outline, from which we can then delve into the details and reasoning of each case.

For example, consider this summary of Roe v. Wade:

The majority opinion: he right to privacy and liberty includes the right to abortion.

The minority opinion (Justices White and Rehnquist): the Constitution does not include a right to abortion.

For many of us, the above “Mishnah” is comprehensible. We have an idea of what the right to privacy and liberty mean, understand what an abortion is, and are familiar with the Constitution.

But now consider the case of The United States v E.C. Knight Co.

The majority opinion: a sugar refining monopoly does not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act because manufacturing is not considered interstate commerce.

The minority opinion: monopolies in manufacturing affect interstate commerce and should be regulated under the Sherman Antitrust Act.

How many of us are familiar with what the Constitution says about interstate commerce or what the Sherman Antitrust Act entails? If we aren’t, we will need assistance to get us up to speed.

And so it is with the Mishnah. When we read a Mishnah, we are reading a summary designed to help us recall basic cases and decisions related to Jewish law. If we are familiar with the details, great. If not, we will need help getting up to speed.

And that leads us to a crucial point about learning Mishnah and Gemara: it is essentially impossible to do so on our own. We will inevitably need teachers and commentaries.

Our teachers will be those individuals who have gained some degree of mastery over the Mishnah and Gemara and can guide us through them. And our commentaries will be those works that have stood the test of time, offering insights and explanations on the texts we study.

Combined, these teachers and commentaries enable us to approach and understand the Mishnah and the Gemara. That’s how it works in Yeshiva, and that’s how it will work here too — as we shall start to see in the next “shiur” (lesson).